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ABSTRACT
Economists have long investigated theoretically and empirically
the relationship between government spending and equilibrium real
exchange rates. As Frenkel and Razin (1996) summarize for a small
open economy , government expenditures (financed by lump-sum taxes)
influence real exchange rates via a resource-withdrawal channel and a
consumption-tilting channel. Recent theoretical and empirical studies ,
such as Froot and Rogoff (1 991) , Rogoff (1 992) , De Gregorio ,
Giovannini , and Kr ueger (1994) , De Gregorio , Giovannini , and Wolf
(1 994) , De Gregorio and Wolf (1 994) , and Chinn and Johnston (1 996) ,
have focused only upon the effects of government spending through the
resource-withdrawal channe l. Extending Frenkel and Razin (1 996) ,
this paper generates closed-form theoretical solutions for the
relationships among the real exchange rate , relative per capita private
consumption , relative per capita government consumption , and relative
per capita tradables and nontradables production in a two-country
general equilibrium mode l. Using relative price level , private and
government per capita consumption , and relative productivity data from
the Summers and Heston (1 991) Penn World Tables and OECD (1 996)
data for a sample of OECD countries relative to the United States , we
estimate the model' s structural equations. The results suggest that
government expenditures influence equilibrium real exchange rates

approximately equally via the resource-withdrawal and consumptiontilting channels. Moreover , the results imply that govemment spending
and private consumption are complements in utility.

JEL Codes: F31 , F41 , E62
Key Words: Real Exchange Rate , Govemment Expenditure
*Corresponding autho r. The authors are grateful to Gwen Bartscherer
and Cindy Cicon for valuable research assistance.
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Government Expenditures and Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates
Economists have long investigated theoretically and empirically the
relationship between govemment spending and real exchange rates, as
recently highlighted in sections of Froot and Rogoff (1 995) , Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1996) , and Rogoff (1996). Frenkel and Razin (1996) summarize
nicely the relationship between govemment spending and real exchange rates
in an intertemporal , neoclassical framework. 1 In the context of a two-period ,
small open economy model , Frenkel and Razin note that govemment
spending influences the private sector and the real exchange rate essentially
through two channels: the resource-withdrawal and consumption-tilting
channels. Regarding the first channel , the influence of govemment
expenditure is similar to that of a negative supply shock; the effect on private
consumption and real exchange rates will depend upon the proportion of
govemment consumption spending falling on nontradables versus that falling
on tradables. Regarding the second channel, Frenkel and Razin point out that
the effect of govemment expenditure on private consumption levels and the
real exchange rate will depend upon the “ characteristics of the utility
function" (p. 165). They note the potential importance of complementarity
versus substitutability between private consumption and govemment
consumption in utility , which dictates how the marginal rate of intertemporal
substitution in utility is influenced by govemment expenditure levels.
Several recent studies of the determinants of equilibrium real exchange
rates have provided neoclassical models amenable to econometric
implementation -- notably Froot and Rogoff (1 991) , Rogoff (1 992) , De
Gregorio , Giovannini , and Krueger (1994) , De Gregorio , Giovannini , and
Wolf (1 994) , De Gregorio and Wolf (1 994) , and Chinn and Johnston (1996).
Although each of these empirical studies incorporates govemment spending ,
all have focused upon the resource• llithdrawal channel for govemment
spending , ignoring the potential relevance theoretically and empirically of
complementarity versus substitutability in utility of private and govemment
consumption , as raised by Frenkel and Razin. De Gregorio , Giovannir祉， and
Krueger (1994) , De Gregorio , Giovannini , and Wolf (1994) , and De
IThroughout we are concemed with govemment spending , not fiscal policy. Govemment spending is
financed here by lump-sum taxes . Since Ricardian equivalence holds in our context , budget deficits related to the
timing of taxation are not re Je vant here
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Gregorio and Wolf (1 994) present static models where govemment
expenditure (financed by lump-sum taxes) falls exclusively on nontradables
and the effect on the real exchange rate is entirely through the resourcewithdrawal channe l. They find a significant short-run (but not long-run)
effect of govemment spending on the real exchange rate. In intertemporal
neoclassical contexts , Rogoff (1 992) and Chinn and Johnston (1 996) find
significant empirical effects of the share of govemment expenditures on real
exchange rates . However, as in the static models above, govemment
spending only works through resource withdrawal , though these models
allow govemment spending on both tradables and nontradables. 2
This paper introduces govemment expenditure into a model of two
countries' representative consumers behavior to investigate how differences
in govemment expenditures between countries (alongside productivity
differences) potentially can explain structural departures from purchasing
power parity (PPP) and movements in equilibrium real exchange rates.
Extending Frenkel and Razin (1 996) , this paper generates closed-form
theoretical solutions for the relationships among the real exchange rate ,
relative per capita private consumption , relative per capita govemment
consumption , and relative per capita tradables and nontradables production in
a general equilibrium model of two countries' representative consumers. In
contrast to the intertemporal neoclassical models of Penati (1987) , Rogoff
(1 992) and Chinn and Johnston (1 996) , govemment expenditure influences
consumers' utility explicitly here , either as a potential substitute for or
complement to private consumption. In further contrast to De Gregorio ,
Giovannini and Kru eger (1994) , De Gregorio , Giovannini and Wolf (1994) ,
and De Gregorio and Wolf (1994) , govemment expenditure is allowed to fall
on tradables as well as nontradables. Application to the model' s structural
equations of relative price level , relative per capita nontradables production ,
and relative per capita private and govemment consumption data from the
Summers and Heston (1991) Penn World Tables and OECD (1 996) data for a
sample of OECD countries relative to the United States suggests three
interesting results. First , govemment expenditures influence equilibrium real
2Penati (1 987) addressed govemment spending (potentially on tradables and nontradables) and equilibrium
real exchange rates in an intertemporal neoc\ assical theoretical model , but similarly focused only upon the resourcewithdrawal channe l. His paper did not provide empirical investigation
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exchange rates in the medium-run via both the resource-withdrawal and
consumption-tilting channels. Second , we find empirically that the
consumption-tilting effect of govemment expenditure on real exchange rates
is approximately equal to the resource-withdrawal effec t. Third, govemment
consumption and private consumption are complements in utility.
While broadly aimed at better understanding the potential role for
govemment spending in affecting structural PPP departures in the context of
an intertemporal neoclassical model, this study additionally sheds light upon
two secondary , but related , issues. First，的 is widely known , aggregate
consumption fluctuations are not highly correlated across countries. Recent
work in open-economy macroeconomics has investigated whether the
distinction between nontradable versus tradable goods can explain the large
and persistent movements in relative national price levels and relative
consumptions among industrialized economies. Backus and Smith (1 993)
highlight the importance of this issue , but find weak empirical support for a
monotonic relationship between the real exchange rate and relati ve
consumption. Because changes in relative prices and relative consumptions
are dri ven in their model by endowment shocks to tradables and
nontradables, the authors qualify their weak empirical results by noting
prominently that a “ more general model" 一 that is , one adrnitting “ demandside shocks" 一 rnight help sort out the issues. The present model employs
changes in relative govemment expenditures to consider such demand-side
shocks' effects on the real exchange rate.
Second , few studies have attempted to evaluate testable implications of
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models of real exchange rates , as
noted by Taylor (1 995). The closed-form theoretical solutions in our study
for the relationships among relative (per capita) consumptions , relative
nontradables production , relative govemment expenditures , and the real
exchange rate lend themsel ves to empirical evaluation. The results offer
insight into the relationship between govemment spending and real exchange
rates in an intertemporal setting and the weak empirical correlations between
relative per capita consumption and real exchange rates documented earlie r.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. The model in section 1
suggests multiple roles for
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prices in a dynamic setting. In section 11 , we describe econometric analogues
to the intertemporal and intratemporal equilibrium conditions derived in
section 1. Section 111 presents empirical results from estimating these
equilibrium conditions and finds plausible parameter estimates of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution , the relative share of nontradable
goods in utility , and the role of govemment expenditures in explaining
relati ve consumption and real exchange rate movements , using data from the
U.N.'s Intemational Comparisons Program and OECD's Annual National
Accounts (1 996). Section IV concludes that govemment spending can
influence equilibrium real exchange rates via both the resource-withdrawal
and consumption-tilting channels , with the consumption-tilting channel
having approximately equal impact on the real exchange rate as the resourcewithdrawal channe l.
I.

A Two-Country Equilibrium Model with Government
Expenditures

Frenkel and Razin (1 996 , sections 8.2-8.4) describe theoretically the
relationship between govemment expenditures and the real exchange rate
using an intertemporal neoclassical model. In the context of a small open
economy , they outline the potential complementary roles for govemment
spending influencing private consumption behavior via the resourcewithdrawal and consumption-tilting channels. However , in their two-country
extension (when either country can influence the world interest rate) , they
introduce govemment spending into the utility function in a “ separable way ,"
implying that the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution in private
consumption “ does not depend on the level of govemment spending" (p.
262).
In the following , we outline a two-country model where both the
consumption-tilting and resource-withdrawal channels of govemment
expenditure are introduced explicitly. The model is a direct extension of
Balvers and Bergstrand (1 997) , amended to include a govemment sector. We
first describe the model and then derive intertemporal and intratemporal
equilibria for specific preferences. Estimable closed-form solutions are
obtained for a nested utility function with constant relative risk aversion in
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consumption and with some symmetry conditions imposed on the preferences
of the two representative consumers.

A. Description of the Model
Following Lucas (1 978) , we abstract from investment decisions by
assurning endowment economies. Stochastic production processes for all
goods are owned by the consumers and yield perishable outputs. Each
country (foreign variables denoted by *) consists of a tradables production
process , a nontradables production process , and one infinitely-lived
representative consumer with a time-additive utility function. The tradables
produced in both countries are perfect substitutes. 3
In the home country and analogously abroad , the representative
consumer maxirnizes the expected present discounted value of the stream of
future utilities from private consumption and the consumption of publi c1 y
provided goods:
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where Eo represents the expectation conditional on information at time 0 , ßis
the standard discount factor , and u(e) is a current-period utility function
strictly concave in the consumption index ct and dependent on gt (per capita
3Since the production processes are exogenous , th巴 consumers take outputs as givens (and factors are
fixed). The exogenous output structure suggests a model that explains medium-run , rather than long-run , real
exchange rate behavio r. As discussed in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996 , Chapter 4), long-run equilibrium real
exchange rates should be determined by supply-side factors alone , as suggested by the Balas 呵 -Samuel so n
hypothesis; relative govemment expenditures and other relative demand shocks should not matter with homothetic
preferences in the long run. However, with exogenous outputs , relative govemment expenditures will affect
equilib 付 um real exchange rates in the medium run. Th is is consistent with empirical studies , such as De Gregorio ,
Giovannini and Wolf (1 994) , where govemment expenditures had short-run , but not long-run , effects on real
exchange rates
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government expenditure). The consumption index at time t , c t in equation
(2) , represents an optimally chosen basket of the tradable good , c tT , and the
nontradable good ,
Preferences over both goods embodied in the
consumption index are assumed to be homothetic in order that an exact price
index may be defined. Without loss of generality , we then may apply a
monotonic transformation such that v( .) in equation (2) is homogeneous of
degree one and concave in the decision variables. In equation (3) , gt
represents government consumption , which is produced from govemment
purchases of tradables , gtT , and nontradables , g戶， via function w(.).
Government consumption is exogenous to the individual consumer and is
financed by lump-sum taxes.
To obtain c1 osed-form solutions for the real exchange rate and relative
consumption (which also make the model amenable to empirical research) ,
we assume a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) current-period utility
function for consumption but with generally specified preferences for the
government expenditures (equation (4)) , and a Cobb-Douglas subutility
function (equation (5)):

ct.

u(c( ,g) = z(g() + h(g)(c() 卜。/(1一σ) ，

c(

= (C(T)l/(l 吋)(C(Nyr/(l 咐

)'>0

σ>0

(4)

(5)

Letting subscripted variables denote first derivatives , assume Zg(g) > O. Then
govemment consumption (g) and pri vate consumption (c) are complements
whenever hig) > 0 and substitutes whenever hg(g) < O. In the case of
substitutes , it can be assured that
c ,g) > 0 only if Zg(g) > O. The
preferences of the two countries' representative consumers may differ
intertemporally in discount factors ßand ß*αnd in functions h(g) and z(g)
versus h*(g) and z*(g), respectively, but parametersσand y are assumed
identical across countries.
The nested structure of the utility function enables us to separate the
representative consumer's decisions into an intratemporal decision concerning
the distribution of overall consumption expenditure between the tradable and

ui
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nontradable goods and an intertemporal decision conceming the demand for
assets and the overall expenditure on current consumption. Thus , the two
equilibrium conditions can be discussed separately.
Assume complete markets so that productivity shocks are insurable. 4
The Second Welfare Theorem now implies that the competitive equilibrium
outcome will be equivalent to the Pareto optimal allocation as chosen by a
social planner. This social planner maximizes the weighted average of the
lifetime utilities of the two countries' representative consumers by choosing
the distribution of the tradable good subject to the available quantity. Due to
the time separability of the lifetime utility functions , the social planner sol ves
the following decision problem for each period:
Mαx
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the constant weight that the social planner places on the utility

4Given the CRRA utility and perfect capital mobility assumptions , it can be shown that the existence of
claims for all produc位on sectors , representing shares in the stochastic endowment processes , is sufficient to
effectively complete markets in our model
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of the foreign consumer. 5 Equation (8) represents the period market-clearing
conditions for nontradable goods in both countries. Equation (9) represents
the period market-clearing condition for tradables goods , reflecting that the
countries' tradable goods are perfect substitutes. As stated earlier, closedform solutions are obtained by constraining some parameters of the utility
functions to be equal , but the representative consumers can still differ with
respect to rates of time preference , initial endowments , benefits derived from
govemment expenditure , and consumption opportunities related to the
nontradable good.
Finally , we define the real exchange rate ，爪， conventionally as:
---AAU
S
、、 J

'，.、
‘

x( = e( p(./p(

where e t is the nominal exchange rate (expressed in units of domestic
cu訂ency per unit of foreign currency) and Pt (Pt*) is the domestic (foreign)

consumption-based price leve 1. 6

B. Intratemporal Equilibrium
The separability of the lifetime utility function implies a budgeting
process where the consumer in each period maximizes the (intratemporal)
value of the consumption index , C p in equation (5) , subject to an after-tax
budget constraint , B p given by:
N

N

',
EA

-A
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+ p(

、、

T

r'，、、

B.( = p(
D.TC.
c(

where PtT (pt) is the domestic consumer price for the tradable (nontradable) ,
thatαdepends on initial relative wealth of the two consumers and the exogenous processes for
expenditures. Our formulation , in which the social planner chooses private expenditure but not public
expenditure , may appear paradoxica l. However , it corresponds to a market outcome for the standard case where
individuals choose their consumption subject to exogenously determined govemment expenditure
5Note

gov巴mment

~e tradable good may serve as the numeraire in both countries , implying e, = 1 in 問uation (10). If
money is introduced explicitly -- for instanc巴， via a binding cash-in-advance constraint , Il\ =p, c, (and analogously
abroad) 一 then the prices of the tradable goods will be determined within the model and the exchange rate can have
any positive value , in principle
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and similarly for the foreign consume r. Choosing consumption of the tradable
good to maximize equation (5) subject to equation (11) yields:
入t = (1 +yrl(CtTrr/(1 吋)(CtN)Y/(1 吋)仇 T

(12)

and similarly for the foreign country , where λt is the Lagrange multiplier.
Given homotheticity of the subutility function (c t ) , one can rewrite
equation (1 1) as:
Bt

PFt

(1 3)

Since the Lagrange multiplier equals the marginal benefit of a unit increase in
the budget on the maximum subutility , we also have:
λt =

ac/aB t

=

lIPt

(1 4)

Combining equations (1 2) and (1 4) , and similarly for the foreign
country , using the market-clearing conditions for the nontradable goods , the
law of one price for tradable goods (p/ = erprT*), and the definition of the real
exchange rate , yields the intratemporal equilibrium condition:
X

t

= (</cl[叫 o

_

gtNo)/ (y t

N

_ gtN)]-r

(1 5)

Equation (1 5) illustrates the expected resource-withdrawal effect of
government spending discussed earlier. A rise in per capita foreign
government purchases of nontradables causes a rise in the real exchange rate ,
that is , a real appreciation of the foreign currency.

c.

Intertemporal Equilibrium

In the intertemporal stage of the budgeting process , the social planner
maximizes in each period equation (6) , the weighted average of the two
consumers' utilities , subject to the constraints in equations (7), (8) and (9).
This yields a set of first-order conditions that , by eliminating the Lagrange
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multiplier, results in:
ß'lh ﹒ (gl')(CI'r O

(clTry/(1 吋)(CIN)y/(1 吋
(cIT'ry/(1 吋)(C N )Y/(I 句

I

﹒

=α

Wh(gl)(c 1 ) 六

(1 6)

From the intratemporal equilibrium , the left hand side of equation (1 6)
equals X t so that the intertemporal equilibrium condition is:
xt=α( ß*/戶 l[ h ﹒ (g I')/h(g 1) ](c l ' /c)-O

(1 7)

where αand (戶*/ßY can be interpreted in the mode l's context as initial relative
wealth and accumulated relative wealth , respectively.7 Equation (1 7)
illustrates the consumption-tilting effect of government spending discussed
earlier and the dependence of the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution
on relative government spending , ornitted in recent studies of government
spending and equilibrium real exchange rates. Higher per capita foreign
government consumption may increase or decrease the real exchange rate ,
depending upon the complementarity or substitutability between government
consumption and pri vate consumption.

D , Interpretation
Figure 1 demonstrates the intratemporal equilibrium locus , INTRA p in
logarithrnic fonn with slope y. It has a positive slope since a higher desired
foreign consumption level implies more demand so that the foreign price level
and , accordingly , the real exchange rate needed for intratemporal equilibrium
are highe r. An increase in foreign government purchases of nontradables (g~*)
withdraws resources from foreign nontradables production. The resulting
excess demand drives up the relative price of nontradables abroad and the real
exchange rate , lowering relative foreign private nontradables consumption
7Note that the intertemporal equilibrium condition is neither stochastic nor explicitly dynamic. Although
the model is derived in a stochastic setting , the assumption of complete markets implies optimal risk sharing so that
relative p討 ces and relatiνe consumption levels are dete口ninistic. Moreover, the dynamic Euler equation linking the
marginal rates of intertemporal substitution of the representative consumers to intertemporal price ratios in a market
economy can be converted to the static version of equation (1 7) when couched in the relative consumption
allocations assigned by a social planner
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expenditure (point A to point B in Figure 1).
Figure 1 also displays in logarithmic terms the negative relationship at
time t between relative consumption and the real exchange rate along the
intertemporal equilibrium locus , INTER I' with slope -σ. A higher relati ve
foreign price level (i.e. , real exchange rate) currently provides relatively more
incentive for the foreign consumer to defer consumption to the future so that
equilibrium current consumption abroad declines relative to the home country.
An increase in foreign govemment consumption (g) can shift the INTER t
curve up or down depending upon whether govemment consumption
complements or substitutes for private consumption. If govemment
consumption complements private consumption (i.e. , hg(g)>O) , INTER t shifts
up , raising the real exchange rate and relative consumption (point A to point C
in Figure 1). If govemment consumption substitutes for private consumption
(i.e. , hg(g)<O) , the reverse happens with a rise in foreign govemment
expenditures (point A to point D in Figure 1). In Figure 1, note the four
possible quadrants for the equilibrium. Initial equilibrium point A assumes
the foreign country has higher per capita consumption and price level than the
home country.
The model can now be solved explicitly for the real exchange rate and
relative consumption expenditure , as suggested by Figure 1. For empirical
pu叩oses ， assume h(g) = gO where 8 > 0 (8 < 0) indicates govemment
consumption complements (substitutes for) private consumption; analogously ,
let h*(g*) = g*o. Combining equations (1 5) and (1 7) then yields reduced
forms:
X

aY/(Y 叮

r

Cr'/C

r

N
N
α l /(門l(ß */戶)[ 1I(門l]r[(Yr * _ g:* )/(y r - g力 p/(門l(gr*/g/，/(門

(19)

Initial wea1th , rates of time preference , nontradables productivity and
govemment expenditures a11 affect relative consumption and the real exchange
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rate. 8 Equation (1 9) , moreover , implies that consumption levels in the two
countries need not be highly correlated , as long as relative nontradables
productivity or relative government expenditure varies substantially.
11. Econometric Issues
The reduction of the general equilibrium model to closed-form
equilibrium conditions (1 5) and (1 7) and to reduced-form real exchange rate
and relative consumption equations (1 8) and (1 9) , respectively , allows
estimation. In this section , we discuss the choice of data and relevant
econometnc lssues.
Given the model describes medium-run behavior , a data set consistent
with such behavior is optimal. Annual data may be most appropriate to
evaluate a medium-run theoretical mode l. Higher frequency data , such as
monthly or quarterly time series , would be more appropriate for explaining
short-run real exchange rate behavior. Lower-frequency data , such as that
averaged over five-year to fifteen-year intervals , is typically used for
explaining long-run economic behavio r. For a similar categorization , see De
Gregorio , Giovannini , and Wolf (1994).
Since our model has implications for both the time-series and crosssectional behavior of real exchange rates , a panel data set is potentially usefu l.
Summers and Heston (1 991) provide annual time series from 1950 to 1988 on
relative per capita private consumption expenditures , relative per capita
government consumption , and relative consumption price levels (or
consumption-based real exchange rates) for 138 countries with the United
States as the numeraire (US= 100) , designed for pooled cross-section timeseries analysis. The only shortcoming is the absence of a decomposition of
expenditures between tradables and nontradables. Fortunately , the OECD
行he reader familiar with the Balassa-Samu e\ son hypothesis may be concerned in equation (18) over the
omission of relative tradables productivity levels. However, the productivity-differentials theory of Balassa and
Samuelson is imbedded in our intratemporal equilibrium. In his analysis , Balassa (1 964) assumes “ invisibles and
capital movements do not ent巴 r the balance of payments ," thus avoiding the relevance of the intertemporal
問 uilibrium. It follows that the trade balance must be assumed equal to zero so that not only y~=c~ but also y"~=c;
Combining equations (7) and (1 5) , assuming no government expendiωres ， with market clearing produces:

x, = [(y;γy;'" )/(y;/y^')p'( I 吋)
which is the Balassa-Samuelson re\ ationship .
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Annual National Accounts, Volume 1I (1 996)

enables construction of relative

shares of consumption expenditures into nontradables (services) and tradables
(commodities) using the same categorization as

(1 982) for the United
1970 through 1988. 9

Kr avis , Heston

and Summers

States and ten other OECD countries over the years

The log-linear versions of reduced-form equations

(1 8)

and

(1 9)

potentially estimable by ordinary least squares (OLS) are:

ln

X

i[ = ~φJ+z {[Y/(Y 叫][ln(見/戶)]} trendj [

-

N

y[σI(y 叫] ln[ (y: -gi7)I(y r _g[N)]
(20)

+ [卸的 +σ)] ln(g;/g) +

c:[

i7

ln (c)c[) = ~吋+ ~ ([lI(y 叫][ln(見/戶)]}的叫[ + [y/(y 叫] ln[ (y _g:)I(y [N _g[N)]
+ [8/(y

+ σ)] ln(g;/g[)

+

(21 )

c~

where Xit is the real exchange rate of country i relative to the United States in
year t , Cit

(令c t ) is per capita consumption in ∞
c ountrηY i (U.S.) , 汎
Y ityFN4-古
g&ilN(仿
yt-gιN

represent臼s per capita nont缸ra
叫
da
油
bles production net of govemment 幼
a bs叩
or叩-ptio
∞
n10
country i (U.S.) , and git (包) is per capita govemment consumption in country i
(U.S.). 1O Variable

trendjt is

a time trend whenj=i and is

0 for j 札戶/戶 is

the

9 The ten other OECD countries are Austria , Canada, Denmark , Finland , France , Greec巴， It aly , Japan ,
Norway , and the United Ki ngdom. In the work of Kr avis , Heston and Summers on the ICP , nontradables
(tradables) are identical to services (commodities) in private final consumption expenditures. Estimation of the
econometric analogues to 巴quations (15) , (18) , and (19) requires data on (yN' _gN')/(yN _gN). OECD Annual National
Accounts does not provide any data on the decomposition of govemment expenditure between tradables and
nontradab1es , and the decompositions for real GDP are limited and for short time periods. However, OECD data
does decompose private consumption expenditures between services (nontradables) and goods (tradables)
Estimation of equations (15) , (18) , and (19) only requires data on relative nontradab 1es consumption , since yN _ gN =
cN(and analogous1y abroad) in the context of th巴 model

IOAs the previous footnote addressed , due to data limitations (y/-git)/(yt-gt) is measured by c//ct
However , due to the potential endogeneity of this RHS variable , c//ct is replaced by an instrument created from its
1agged value and a constan t. Although a Hausman specification test did not indicate evidence of endogeneity , the
results presented in this paper use the instrument to ensure that this RHS variable is predete口nin巴d. Results using

lS

discount rate in country j relative to the U.S. discount rate when j=i. The E'S
are i .i .d. error terms and φ'/ and <D/ are dummy variables assuming the value
1 whe叫 =i and 0 when j 吐， to reflect exogenous differences in initial wealth. 11
Since the data set includes time series as well as cross section
observations , one needs to address the issue of data stationarity over time. If
the individual time series are stationary in log-levels , coefficient estimates in
these regressions are consistent and the student t-distribution can be used to
evaluate their statistical significance. However , if the individual time series
are stationary in first-differences of their log-levels but the series are
cointegrated , OLS coefficient estimates are consistent but standard t-statistics
would have to be adjusted to evaluate the coefficients' statistical significance.
Although the time-series dimension of our data (T=36) is fairly small by
most time-series analyses standards , Levin and Lin (1992) show theoretically
the increased power of testing for unit roots in short time series by pooling
data cross-sectionally. 1n particular, they demonstrate that when the time
dimension is of “ moderate length (i.e. , 25-100 periods) ," pooling data crosssectionally with only a small number of individuals can dramatically increase
the power of the unit root tes t. They note that with only 25 time-series periods
but a panel of 10 units (similar to this study) , the power of the test exceeds 90
percen t. Three studies (Frankel and Rose , 1996; Oh , 1996; and Wu , 1996)
found evidence that real exchange rates are stationary in log-levels by pooling
time-series data across country pairs.
Using the techniques in Levin and Lin (1 992) , we conducted similar
tests of stationarity for our relative price level , relative (per capita)
consumption level , and relative (per capita) govemment consumption level
variables for the period 1953 to 1988 for all ten countries (relative to the
United States).12 The results of the tests for nonstationarity are presented in
C/Ic,N(instead of the instrument) provide a sinúlar fit and the coefficient estimates are not materially differen t.
latter results are omitted here for brevity , but are available upon
II For

ηle

r叫 uest

econometric convenienc皂， we use an intercept and 9 dummy variables

12 As noted earlier , data was available for these variables for the period 1953-1988. Data was available for
relative nontradables consumption levels only for the much shorter period 1973-1988. Since the unit root tests for
the shorter period for all variables would have had a time dimension (with necessary lags) of only 12 perio白， we
considered this time dimension too short to benefit from the power of the Le vin-Lin tests. Consequently , we chose
to conduct the unit root tesls for all the variables excepl relalive nonlradables consumption for the longer pe 討 od of
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Tables 1-3. The tests indicated that the null hypothesis of nonstationarity
could be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of stationarity for a lI
three variables at the 5 percent significance level , with or without intercepts ,
time trends , an d/or fixed-year effects , consistent with the three studies for real
exchange rates reported earlie r. 13 Consequently , we are able to estimate
specifications (20) and (21) in level form.
An econometric issue not yet addressed is the identification of the
parameters. Equations (20) and (21) are reduced forrns from a system of
equations that are overidentified. 14 Consequently , indirect least squares cannot
be used efficiently to identify the parameter estimates , but two-stage least
squares (2SLS) can be used. Two-stage least squares estimation of:

In

ln

X ir

X ir

~可+ y 1 叭Ic) - y In[ (y ;r'N

百封+百 [ln(ß/ß)]

-

N , ,, N
N"
g;r')/以
- g/Y)
]

trendjr - σl叭Ic)

+

+

8 1 向Ig)

e:r

+

(22)

e~

ρ3)

can yield unique parameter estimates of the relative share of tradables in
utility (11 [1 +y]) , the relative discount rates (ßj /戶)， the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution (11σ) ， and degree of complementarity or
substitutability of government consumption for private consumption (8).

1953-1988. The re s ults 紅e for tests where the test statistics ar巴 asymptotically nom1ally distributed . We did not
include tests with individual fixed effects; these effects were statistically insignificant
13 For the relati ve p付 ce variable , the null hypothesis could only be r句 ected at the 10 percent significance
level when only an intercept was added
14 For instance , dividing the coefficient for coun 的， 1's time trend in equation (20) , ([y/(汁的 )[ln (戶 /戶口， by
the coefficient for this time trend in equation (2 1) , {[I/(y+σ)][ln ( 戶 /ßl}' yields identification of y. However ,
dividing the coefficient for coun 叮 2's (or 3's , etc.) time trend in equation (20) , {[y/(汁。 ) )[ln ( ß!ßl}' by the
coefficient for this time trend 肌肉 uation (2 1), {[ 1/( 汁。 )][ln ( ß!ßl}' yields identification of y also. Th us , using
indirect least squ紅的 with the reduced forms cannot identify uniquely y or any of the 10 country pai 吋 ngs' relati ve
discount rates
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Conventional 2SLS is applied. In the first stage , we estimate the reducedform equation (21) to obtain the predicted values of ln( cjcJ In the second
stage , the predicted values of ln( cjc t ) , denoted pvln(cjc t ) , are used as an
“ instrument" for ln(cjc t ). Hence , regressions (22) and (23) will use the
predicted values of ln( cjc t ) from the first stage.
Finally , OLS estimation of these equations (reduced-forms or secondstage of 2SLS) willlead to consistent estimates. However, in the presence of
potential autocorrelation an d/or heteroskedasticity of the error terms , the
standard errors of the coefficient estimates may be inefficien t. To account for
this , we employ the heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent
covariance estimator of Newey and West (1 987).
III. Empirical Results
In this section , we present first the results of estimating reduced-forrn
equations (20) and (21). The estimate of reduced-form equation (21)
generates the instrument for estimating structural equations (22) and (23).

A.

Reduced-Form Equations
OLS estimation of equations (20) and (21) yields:
ln X it =4.3753 - 0.8429 ln[~t-g~，)I(I，'.gN)] + 0.3578 ln(g/gt)
(1 8.65)

(2.18)

(2.17)

+ 0.0088 TrendAus it . 0.0103 TrendCan it - 0.0065 TrendDen it
(0.98)

(2.08)

(0.56)

+ 0.0046 TrendFin it + 0.0032 TrendFra it - 0.0212 TrendGre
(0 .4 2)

(0.37)

(2.47)

+ 0.0041 Trendlta it + 0.0325 Tren dJpn it + 0.0022 TrendNor it

(24)
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(0 .4 5)

(0.22)

(3.34)

+0.0042 TrendUKit + 0.1479 DVCan it - 0 .4 925 DVDen it

(1 .18)

(0.66)

(1. 36)

- 0.1530 DVFin it - 0.5780 DVFra it - 3.0579 DVGre it
(0.79)

(1. 68)

(1. 94)

- 0.6060 DVlta it + 0.0129 DVJpn it - 0.2075 DVNorit . 0.3066 DVUKit
(2.04)

(0.09)

R 2 =0.64 , AdjR 2 =0.59 , S.E.E.

(0.77)

(2.34)

=0.141 , n = 180

ln(c/c t ) =. 0.2482 + 0 .4778 ln[(I:>g~y(l，'-g~)] + 0.2164 ln(g沌 t)
(5 .4 5)

(7 .30)

(4 .80)

- 0.0030 TrendAus it . 0 .0027 TrendCan it . 0.0123 TrendDen
(2.59)

(1 .50)

- 0.0039 TrendFin it - 0.0055 TrendFra it
(2.23)

(4.66)

(8.20)

-

0.0046 TrendGre
(4.07)

+ 0.0035 Trendlta it + 0.0001 Tren dJpn it - 0.0042 TrendNor it

(25)
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(3.61)

(0.04)

(2.28)

+ 0.0016 TrendUK jr + 0.2542 DVCanjr + 0 .4434 DVDenjr
(0.99)

(8.20)

(4.99)

+ 0.0592 DVFin j r + 0 .4 849 DVFra jr + 1. 6019 DVGre jr
(1. 24 )

(5.72)

(4.05)

+ 0.2799 DVJta jr + 0.0500 DVJpn jr + 0.2048 DVNorjr + 0.0309 DVUKjr
(4.02)

(2.54)

R1 =0.99 , AdjR1 =0.98 , S.E. E.

(3.22)

(1 .00)

=0.027 , n = 180

Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses and S.E.E. is the standard
error of the regression.
The results indicate that relative per capita nontradables output has the
expected negative relationship with the real exchange rate in (24) and
expected positive relationship with relative per capita consumption in (25).
Relative per capita govemment consumption has a positive relationship with
both the real exchange rate and relative per capita private consumption ,
suggesting that govemment consumption complements private consumption
via the consumption-tilting channel. However, as discussed earlier, indirect
least squ征es cannot identify uniquely structural p訂ameters because of
overidentification. Equation (25) is used in the first stage of 2SLS to generate
the instrument , denoted pvln(c/c t ) , used in the next section.

B.

Structural Equations

20

Two-stage least squares estimation of equations (22) and (23) -- with
the restriction that the slope coefficient estimates in intratemporal equilibrium
condition (22) be equal but oppositely signed (consistent with the model) 一
yields:
ln X it = 4.8636 + l. 2008 pvln(c/ct )
(50.20)
(2.15)

-

l. 2008 ln[(y';>g~y(~-g~)]

(2.15)

- 0.3705 DVCan it . 0 .8452 DVDen it . 0.1730 DVFin
(2 .4 5)
(l. 66)
(l. 02)
- l. 0233 DVFra it - 4 .4 972 DVGre it . 0.9774 DVlta it

(2.03)

(2.28)

(26)

(2.71)

+ 0.1017 DVJpn j( - 0.3865 DVNorit - 0 .4 051 DVUKit
(1 .29)
(l. 31)
(3.19)
R2 = 0.53 , A再jR 2 = 0.50 , S.E.E. = 0.156 , n = 180

ln X it = 3.9375 - 1. 7638 pvln(c/cJ + 0.7396 ln(g/gJ
(9.70)
(2.18)
(2.96)

+ 0.0035 Tren dA us it - 0.0150 TrendCan it - 0.0281 TrendDen
(0.37)
(3 .16)
(l. 80)
- 0.0022 TrendFin; ,- 0.0066 TrendFra it - 0.0293 TrendGre
(0.20)
(0.77)
(3 .62)
+ 0.0102 Trendlta j(+ 0.0326 Tren dJpn it . 0.0052 TrendNorit
(0.95)
(3.34)
(0.54)

+ 0.0071 TrendUKit + 0.5963 DVCan it + 0.2895 DVDen
(1.1 2)
(2.24)
(1. 99)
- 0.0485 DVFin it + 0.2772 DVFra it - 0.2324 DVGreit
(0.27)
(l. 83)
(0.74)
- 0.1124 DVlta it + 0.1011 DVJpn it + 0.1538 DVNorit - 0.2521 DVUKit
(0.98)
(0.71)
(1.1 0)
(2.02)
R2 = 0 . 64 ， A吋R 2 = 0.59 , S.E.E. = 0.141 , n = 180

Absolute values of t-statistics are again in parentheses.

(27)
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The 2SLS estimation of the intratemporal and intertemporal equilibrium
conditions suggests the following inferences regarding govemment
expenditures , in the context of the mode l. Equation (26) implies that an
increase in home govemment purchases of nontradables creates excess
demand for nontradables. This has the effect of withdrawing resources from
private nontradables consumption and raising the relative price of (private
consumption) nontradables to tradables , causing a real appreciation of the
home cuπency; this is the resource-withdrawal effec t. Additionally , equation
(27) implies that an increase in per capita govemment expenditure raises the
marginal utility of home private consumption , raising both home per capita
private consumption and the home relative price of nontradables to tradables ,
causing a real appreciation of the home cu叮ency. The positive estimate of Ò
suggests that govemment consumption and private consumption are
complements; the estimate of Ò (0.7396) is statistically significantly different
from zero at the 1 percent leve l.
The 2SLS estimation of the intratemporal and intertemporal equilibrium
conditions yields the following inferences of the model's other parameters.
The estimated inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (or the
coefficient of relative risk aversion) ， σ ， equals 1. 76. This estimate is
consistent with those in the closed-economy macroeconornics literature;
estimates of σrange typically between 0 and 2. This estimate is statistically
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.
The estimate of y is 1.2; this coefficient is statistically significant at the
5 percent leve l. The equation was estimated also with the restriction relaxed.
Using a X2 statistic , equality of the two coefficients in intratemporal condition
(26) , allowing for the sign difference , could not be rejected at the 5 percent
significance level (χ2=1.14 compared to critical value X2[0.95;lJ=3.84). This
estimate of y implies a share of nontradables in the period Cobb-Douglas
utility function of 0.55 , which is quite plausible.
The estimated values of relative discount rates , ß/戶， in equation (27)
range between -3 percent for Greece and 3 percent for Japan. The estimates
suggest that the U.S. rate of time preference is not notably greater than that of
several othcr OECD countries. However , the results suggest that the United
State
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statistically less thrifty than Japan.

C.
Relative Effects of Government Expenditure Consumptioll Tiltillg vs.
Resource Withdrawαl
The parameter estimates in equations (26) and (27) allow us to estimate
the relative importance of the resource-withdrawal versus consumption-tilting
effects of government expenditure on real exchange rates. To illustrate the
relative effects for a one percent increase in the home country's (U.S.)
govemment purchases of nontradables (g~) ， consider theoretical real exchange
rate equation (20). Differentiating equation (20) with respect to g~ yields:
d ln Xir

= 一 [ycr/(y+σ)]

N

N

d ln[ lI(y/' -gr")] + [8y/(y + σ)] d ln( lIg r)

(28)

Recalling equation (3) , assume govemment consumption is a Cobb-Douglas
function of government nontradables and govemment tradables , where ç
denotes the share of nontradables in govemment consumption. Thcn equation
(28) becomes:

,

dX /x ir

N" N
N" • N , N
- [yσ/(y+σ)][g/ï(y/'
-g/')]
dg/ïg/' - Ç[8y/(y+σ)ldgr/grh(29)

The first (second) terrn on the RHS represents the resource-withdrawal
(consumption-tilting) effect of a one percent increase in home govemment
purchases of nontradables. To evaluate the contribution of the first tenn , an
estimate of g~/(y~-g~) is needed and to evaluate the second terrn an estimate of
ç is needed. Such data is not available for any country in either Summers and
Heston (1 991) or OECD Annual National Accounts (1 996). However, the
U.S. National Income and Product Accounts decompose govemment and
private consumption expenditures into goods and services , which is used
typically to approximate the decomposition into tradables and nontradables.
For the United States ,
g伙
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1970-19gg. Substituting these values into equation (29) , along with the
paramctcr rstimates of yσ/(y+σ) and '6y/(y+σ) yields:
dx ,/x i,

N

-0.3624 dg ,"/g ,"

-

0.2755 dg/'/gr

(30)

Equation (30) indicates that the estimated magnitude of the resourcewithdrawal effect on the real exchange rate of a one percent increase in U.S.
government purchases of nontradables is only slightly greater than the
consumption-tilting effec t.
If a U.S. government consumption increase of one percent is
proportionate across nontradables and tradables , the theoretical effect on the
real exchange is:
dXi/X ir

-

N"

N

[yσ/(y+σ )][g/ï(y/'

N

-g ,")] dg/g , -

[òy/(y+σ)]

dg / g r

(31 )

Substituting into equation (31) the appropriate parameter estimates yields:
dx，/x i ，

一 0.3624

dg/g r - 0.3578 dg/g r

(32)

In the case of proportionate increases in U.S. government tradables and
nontradables consumption , a one percent increase in government consumption
appreciates the dollar by roughly 0.7 of one percent; the source of the dollar's
real appreciation is estimated to be attributable approximately equally to the
consumption-tilting and resource-withdrawal channels.

IV. Conclusions
The NBER Reporter noted not too long ago that:

One of the recent areas of resurgent research in open economy
macroeconomics has been the examination of real exchange rates. .
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Chinn and Johnston find that government spending and productivity
trends help in the analysis of real exchange rates; their finding is
confirmed by Canzoneri , Cumby , and Diba , and by De Gregorio and
Wolf (Rose , 1997 , pp. 1-2).

This paper has extended the intertemporal neoclassical framework for a small
open economy in Frenkel and Razin (1 996) to examine theoretically and
empirica l1 y the “ resource-withdrawal" versus “ consumption-ti 1ting" effects of
government expenditure on real exchange rates. Closed-form theoretical
solutions from a two-country , stochastic , dynamic , general equilibrium model
il1 ustrated the effect of government expenditure on private consumption
decisions through intratemporal and intertemporal channels.
Empirical evaluation of the model using panel data from the U.N.
Income Comparisons Program and OECD (1 996) provides evidence that a per
capita government expenditure increase may be causing a real appreciation of
a country's

cu叮ency

via resource withdrawal in the medium run.

Simultaneously , the same government spending increase may causc the
country's

cu叮ency

to appreciate in real terms because government

consumption complements the utility from private consumption. Moreover,

2S

these cffccts are found in the context of plausible parameter estimates of the
countries rcpresentative consumers' elasticities of intertemporal substitution ,
relative rates of time preference , and shares of nontradables in utility. The
empirical results suggest that the potential importance of the consumptiontilting channel should not be ignored since this channel has roughly an equal
effect on the real exchange rate as the resource-withdrawal channel.
The cxtant literature on real exchange rates has traditionally perceived
the real appreciation of a country's

cuπency

as a cost necessarily incurred to

benefit from the provision of public goods , interpreted typically as the
oppo口unity

cost ofjoregone private consumption (notably of nontradables

private consumption). Our framework and empirical results suggest that the
associated real appreciation of a country' s currency in response to increased
public consumption can be interpreted partiaIl y as the shadow price of a
benefit to the representative agent' s utility from the complementarity of
govemment and private consumption. This suggests reconsidering the relative
benefits of public expenditures and their implications for explaining
departures from purchasing power parity.
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Table 1
Tests for Nonstationarity of Relative Price Le vels
Using Panel Data and Levin-Lin (1992)

Model

O{\

la. ~Yit
lb. ~Yit

= (Po-l) Yit-I + Eit
= (Po-l) Yit-I + PI ~Yit-I

lc. ~Yit

= (Po-I) Yit-I + PI ~Yit-I

Estimate

t-statlstlc

10% (5%)
Cri!ical t

Null Hypo!hesis
of
Nonstationarity l

-0.04
-0.06

-2.68
-3 .88

-1 .4 4 (-1. 81)
-l. 44 (-1. 81)

Rejcct (Rcject)
Rejcct (Rcject)

-0.06

-3 .69

-1. 44 (-1. 81)

Rejcct (R吋 ect)

-0.03

-1. 91

-1. 72 (-2.09)

+ Eit

+ P2 ~Yi t-2 + Eit
2a. ~Yit

=80 + (Po-l) Yit-I + Eit

Rejcct (No!
R吋 ect)

2b . ~Yit

=80 + (Po-l) Yit-I

+ Pl ~Yi卜 1 + Eit
2c. ~Yit = 80 + (Po- l) Yit-l
+ PI ~Yit-l + P2 ~Yit-2
+ Eit
3a. ~Yit

= 80 + 81 t + (Po-l) Yit-I

+ Eit
3b. ~Y i ( = 80 + 8 1 t + (Po-l) Yit-l
+ PI ~Y it- l + Eit
3c. ~Yi( = 8日 + 8 1 t + (Po-l) Yi(-I
+ Pl ~Yi(-1 + P2 ~Yi(-2
+ Ei(
4a. ~Yit
4b. ~Yi(

= (Po-l) Yit-I + vt + Eit
=(Po-I) Yit-I + Pl ~Yit- I

4c. ~Yit

= (Po-l) Yit-I + Pl ~Yit- I

-0.05

-3 .35

-1. 72 (-2 .09)

Reject (Reject)

-0.05

-3 .08

-1. 72 (-2.09)

R吋 ect (R吋 ect)

-0.07

-3 .85

-2 .01 (-2.39)

Rejcct (Reject)

-0.10

-5.33

-2 .0 I (-2.39)

Rcjcc! (R叮 ect)

-0.10

-5.06

-2 .01 (-2.39)

Rejcc! (Rcjcct)

-0.04
-0.05

-2 .89
-3 .06

-2 .01 (-2.39)
-2 .0 I (-2.39)

Rej C' c! (R<'Jcct)
Rej<'c! (R <,ject)

-0.04

-3.00

-2 .01 (-2.39)

Reject (Reject)

+ v( + Ei(
+ P2 ~Y it-2 + v( + Ei(

1At the 10% (5 % ) significance level
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Table 2
Tests for Nonstationarity of Relative Per Capita Consumption Levels
Using Panel Data and Le vin-Lin (1992)

Model

2IIEstimate

la. !::.Yil
lb. !::.Y Il

=(Po-l) Yil-l + eil
=(ρ0- 1 ) Yil-l + Pl !::.Yil-l

lc. !::.Y Il

=(ρ0- 1 ) Yil-l + Pl !::.Yil-l

t-statlstlc

10% (5%)
Critical t

Nu l\ Hypothesis
of
Nonstationarity l

-0.02
-0.02

-9.55
-7.74

-1. 44 (-1. 81)
-1. 44 (-1. 81)

Reject (Reject)
Reject (Reject)

-0.02

-6.98

-1. 44 (-1. 81)

Reject (Reject)

-0.03
-0.03

-7 .4 3
-6.64

-1. 72 (-2.09)
-1. 72 (-2.09)

Reject (Reject)
Reject (Reject)

-0.03

-6.39

-l. 72 (-2.09)

Reject (Reject)

+ Cil

+ 112 !::.Yil-2 + eil
2a. !::.Y Il
2b. !::.Y'l

=Òo + (Po-l) Yil-l + eil
=00 + (Po-l) Yil-l

2c. !::.Y'l

=Òo + (Po-l) Yil-l

+ rl !::.Yil-l + eil

+ Pl !::.Yil-l + P2 !::.Yil-2
+ ell
3a. !::.Yil

=00 + 0

(Po- l) Yil-l

-0.03

-6.25

-2.01 (-2.39)

Reject (Reject)

3b. !::.Yil

=

-0.03

-5 .74

-2.01 (-2.39)

Reject (Reject)

3c. !::.Yil

=

(Po-l) Y叭- 1
+ eil
(Po-l) Yil-l
+ P2 !::.Yil-2

-0.03

-5.66

-2.01 (-2.39)

Reject (Reject)

4a. !::.Yil
4b. !::.Yil

=(Po-l) Yil-l + vl + eil
=(Po-l) Yil- l + Pl !::.Yil- l

-0.03
-0.03

-7 .10
-6.10

-2.01 (-2.39)
-2.01 (-2.39)

Reject (Reject)
Reject (Reject)

4c. !::.Yit

=(Po-l) Yil-l + Pl !::.Yit l

-0.03

-5.84

-2.01 (-2.39)

Reject (Reject)

1t +
+ eil
00 + 0 1 t +
+ Pl !::.Yil-l
00 + 0 1 t +
+ Pl !::.Yil-l
+ eil

+Vl + eil

.

+ P2 !::.Yit-2 + vl + eit

lAt the 10% (5 %) significance level

Table 3
Tests for Nonstationarity of Relative Per Capita Government Consumption Le vels
Using Panel Data and Levin-Lin (1992)

Model

Po Estimate

la. ~Yi t
lb. ~ Yit

= (Po-l ) Yit-I + eit
= (Po-l) Yit-I + PI ~Y it - I

lc. ~Y it

= (Po-l) Yit-I + PI ~Y i t-I

t -statlstlc

10% (5 % )
Critical t

Null Hypothesis
of
Nonstationaritv l

-0 .03
-0.02

-12.66
-9.3 8

-1. 44 (- 1. 81)
-1. 44 (-1. 81)

Reject (Reject)
Reject (Reject)

-0_02

-8 .94

-1 .44 (-1. 8 1)

Reject (Reject)

-0.02
-0.02

-4 .32
-4 .37

-1. 72 (-2.09)
-1. 72 (-2 .09)

R吋 ect

-0.02

-3. 86

-1. 72 (-2 .09)

R吋 ect (R吋 ect)

-0.02

-3 .37

-2.01 (-2.39)

Reject (Reject)

-0 .02

-3 .27

-2 .01 (-2 .39)

Reject (Reject)

-0.01

-3 .18

-2 .01 (-2.39)

Reject (Reject)

-0.02
-0 .01

-5 . 11
-4.61

。 2 . 01

(-2 .39)
-2 .01 (-2 .39)

Reject (Rejec t)
Reject (Reject)

-0.01

-4 .62

-2.01 (-2.39)

Reject (Reject)

+ eit

+ P2 ~Yit-2 + eit
2a. ~Y it
2b . ~Y it

= 80 + (Po-l) Yi卜 1 + eit
= 80 + (Po-l) Yit- I

2c . ~ Y it

= 80 + (Po-l) Yit-I

Reject (Reject)
(Reject)

+ PI ~ Yi卜 1 + eit
+ PI ~Yit-I + P2 ~Yit-2
+ eit

3a. ~ Yit

=80 + 81 t + (Po-l) Yit-I

+ eit
3b . ~ Yit = 80 + 8 1 t + (Po-l) Yit-I
+ PI ~Yit﹒ 1 + eit
3c. ~ Yi t = 80 + 8 1 t + (Po-l) Yit-I
+ PI ~Yit- I + P2 ~Yit- 2
+ eit
4a. ~Y i t
4b. ~Yit

= (Po-l ) Yit-I + v t + eit
= (Po-l) Yit- I + PI ~Yit-I

4c. ~Y it

= (Po-l) Yit-I + PI ~Yit- I

+V t + eit

+ P2 ~Y i t-2 + v t + eit

'At the 10% (5 %) significance level.
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